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This thesis examines the reasons why defense reorganizations have 
failed to ensure effective interoperability of the armed forces. Past joint 
operations are surveyed to determine the characteristics of successful and 
unsuccessful operations. The provisions of each defense reorganization and 
the success of each reorganization in improving interoperability are 
discussed. Analysis of defense reorganizations and subsequent joint 
operations are used to postulate the causes of interoperability problems and 
explain the effects of defense reorganizations. The thesis describes how 
defense reorganizations did not reduce the autonomy of the services, 
allowing them to perpetuate service cultures that minimize the importance 
of interoperability. Analysis of past joint operations shows that interaction 
between the services reduces interoperability problems, but that these lessons 
have been lost as the services return to their non-interactive peacetime 
operations. Routine interaction between the services is proposed as the 
means to preserve these lessons and change service culture to accept the 
importance of interoperability. Means to increase routine interaction are 
offered. The thesis concludes with analysis of recent events and a discussion 
of prospects for continued improvements to interoperability. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As joint operations become a larger part of U.S. military operations, the 
ability of the armed forces to conduct them effectively becomes more important. 
Interoperability, the capability of forces from one service to operate effectively 
with forces from other services, has become a required capability of the armed 
forces.  Past joint operations have had mixed success, and those that 
succeeded often repeated problems experienced in previous conflicts. An 
increasingly risk-averse Congress, and the public they represent, will be less 
tolerant of such initial growing pains in future joint operations.  This thesis 
surveys past joint operations and uses basic psychological and sociological 
concepts to present an alternate explanation for interoperability problems and to 
propose possible solutions for those problems. 
Several defense reorganizations during this century focused on inadequate 
command structures as the main impediment to interoperability.   None were 
entirely successful because their reliance on command structure only treated a 
symptom of the actual problem: the historical lack of interaction between the 
services.  "Interaction" refers to military activity where more than one service 
operates in concert toward a common objective.  Interaction includes, but is not 
limited to, joint combat operations.  It also includes activities where one service 
provides administrative, logistic, or other support to another service, or activities 
where two services have overlapping responsibilities. 
Statutory divisions produced autonomous services, and separate missions 
caused a lack of interaction.  These factors caused the services to evolve 
separately.  The different experiences of each service, explained by different 
philosophies, created separate service cultures.  Separate service cultures 
produced two main effects. 
- First, the separate philosophies of the services meant that they did not 
always agree on campaign goals.  If the individual service commanders 
could not agree, cooperation would not occur.  This was perceived as the 
actual problem, and was, therefore, the focus of efforts to improve 
interoperability during and after World War II. 
- Second, the service staffs designed equipment and procedures to 
accomplish their individual missions with little regard for operations with the 
other services.  In many cases, this produced coincidentally incompatible 
procedures and equipment.  Defense reorganizations, which left service 
autonomy largely intact, have not solved this part of the problem. 
Successful joint operations show that interaction enhances interoperability 
by revealing problems, suggesting solutions, and promoting trust.  But the 
lessons learned during previous joint operations were often lost because the 
services returned to their normal single-service operations after each conflict. 
Since the services remain responsible to train and equip their forces, sustained 
improvements to interoperability require changing service culture.  Increased 
routine interaction will help to preserve the lessons learned during previous joint 
operations and to alter the experiences of the services that form the basis of 
service culture. As interaction becomes a normal part of each service's 
operations, interoperability will become an important requirement for each 
service. As service culture changes to accept the importance of interoperability, 
it will become a planning assumption for service staffs.  Increasing routine 
xi 
interaction will accomplish what centralized command structures could not: 
interoperable armed forces. 
XII 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although they have received more emphasis in recent years, joint operations 
have occurred throughout U.S. history. As joint operations become a larger part of 
U.S. military operations, the ability of the armed forces to conduct them effectively 
becomes more important. Past joint operations have had mixed success, and those 
that succeeded often repeated problems experienced in previous conflicts. 
An increasingly risk-averse Congress, and the public they represent, will be 
less tolerant of such initial growing pains in future joint operations. Interoperability 
has become a required capability of the armed forces. For this thesis, 
"interoperability" is the capability of forces from one service to operate effectively 
with forces from other services. Interoperability requires compatible equipment and 
common doctrine, planned and exercised in advance, instead of relying on 
battlefield modifications of equipment and procedures. 
Recognition of problems with joint operations is not new. Several defense 
reorganizations have occurred during this century, all of which focused on 
inadequate command structures as the main impediment to interoperability. In each 
case, unified command was seen as the means to make the services operate 
together effectively. None of the reorganizations were entirely successful in 
achieving this objective. 
Defense reorganizations have not improved interoperability because their 
reliance on command structures only treats a symptom of the actual problem: the 
1 
objective. Interaction includes, but is not limited to, joint combat operations. It also 
includes activities where one service provides administrative, logistic, or other support 
to another service, or activities where two services have overlapping responsibilities. 
Statutory divisions produced autonomous services, and separate missions 
caused a lack of interaction. These factors caused the services to evolve separately. 
The different experiences of each service, explained by different philosophies, created 
separate service cultures. Separate service cultures produced two main effects. 
First, the separate philosophies of the services meant that they did not always 
agree on campaign goals. If the individual service commanders could not agree, 
cooperation would not occur. This was perceived as the actual problem, and was, 
therefore, the focus of efforts to improve interoperability during and after World War 
II. 
Second, the service staffs designed equipment and procedures to accomplish 
their individual missions with little regard for operations with the other services. In 
many cases, this produced coincidentally incompatible procedures and equipment. 
Defense reorganizations, which left service autonomy largely intact, have not solved 
this part of the problem. 
Successful joint operations show that interaction enhances interoperability by 
revealing problems, suggesting solutions, and promoting trust. But the lessons 
learned during previous joint operations were often lost because the services returned 
to their normal single-service operations after each conflict. Since the services remain 
responsible to train and equip their forces, sustained improvements to interoperability 
require changing service culture.  Increased routine interaction will help to preserve 
the lessons learned during previous joint operations and to alter the experiences of 
the services that form the basis of service culture. As interaction becomes a normal 
part of each service's operations, interoperablity will become an important requirement 
for each service. As service culture changes to accept the importance of 
interoperability, it will become a planning assumption for service staffs. Increasing 
routine interaction will accomplish what centralized command structures could not: 
interoperable armed forces. 
This thesis surveys past joint operations and uses basic psychological and 
sociological concepts to present an alternate explanation for interoperability problems 
and to propose a possible solution for those problems. It is limited by two factors. 
There has been little study of pre-World War II joint operations, as opposed to the 
separate study of military and naval operations, requiring this author to extrapolate 
relationships between the persons involved. Psychological and sociological studies 
of military affairs have focused on how individuals adapt to military life or how unit 
cohesion develops, rather than how personnel absorb the attitudes that comprise 
service culture. As a result, many of the ideas in this thesis are proposals rather than 
proof. Further research is needed to validate the individual facets of the conceptual 
framework presented here. 
Chapter II examines problems with joint operations and how defense 
reorganizations failed to solve those problems. Chapter III discusses the historical 
sources of problems with interoperability, how separate service cultures produced non- 
interoperable forces, and why defense reorganizations alone failed to make lasting 
improvements to interoperability. Chapter IV examines successful joint operations to 
show how interaction promotes interoperability, discusses how routine interaction can 
sustain improvements to interoperability, and proposes means to increase routine 
interaction. Finally, Chapter V analyzes recent events to determine their impact on 
increasing routine interaction, and draws conclusions about the future of interaction 
and interoperability. 
II.  PROBLEMS AND ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS 
A.     INTEROPERABILITY: AN ENDURING PROBLEM 
According to Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces. Joint Publication 1 of 11 
November 1991: 
[the] nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team .. . Joint force 
commanders choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space 
and special operations forces at their disposal .... Joint warfare is essential 
to victory.1 
Joint Publication 1 gives the impression that the requirement for interoperability has 
recently been recognized, and that the Armed Forces should incorporate this lesson 
into their planning. 
This is not the case. Efforts to improve interoperability began with the 
establishment of the Joint Army and Navy Board in 1903. Joint Action of the Army 
and the Naw. signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy in 1927, states that: 
[it] is vital to success in war that the Army and the Navy so coordinate their 
actions as to produce the most effective mutual support. [This requires] that 
both services have a common, definite understanding of their respective 
functions in national defense and of the approved methods for attaining 
coordination in operations.2 
1
 Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces. Joint Publication 1 
(Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991), iii. 
2
 Joint Army and Navy Board, Joint Action of the Armv and the Naw (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1927), iv.  Hereafter cited as JAAN. 
Although the need to conduct joint operations has long been recognized, the U.S. has 
a mixed record of success with interoperability. This chapter examines the problems 
experienced during several U.S. joint operations, since they motivated the defense 
reorganizations carried out during this century. The provisions of each defense 
reorganization will be reviewed. Analyses of subsequent joint operations are used to 
determine the effectiveness of each reorganization in improving interoperability. 
B.     19th CENTURY JOINT OPERATIONS 
1.     The War of 1812 
The War of 1812 provided an early opportunity for joint operations, 
especially in the northern theater. Lakes Erie and Ontario divided the theater, and 
Lake Champlain stood along the traditional invasion route between New York and 
Montreal. A successful campaign would require control of these waters, and would 
be aided by effective cooperation between land and naval forces. 
Unfortunately, such cooperation was not always present. Captain Isaac 
Chauncey, commanding U.S. naval forces on Lake Ontario, interpreted his orders 
from the Secretary of the Navy as a mandate to destroy the enemy fleet; he would 
"not be diverted in [his] efforts ... by any sinister attempt to render [his forces] 
subordinate to, or an appendage of, the army."3 Although he adequately supported 
Major General Dearborn's expedition against York in the spring of 1813, he refused 
to support a similar expedition by Brigadier General Harrison in late 1813. President 
Madison approved an attack in July 1814 against York.   Since  Chauncey's orders 
3
 Chauncey quoted in Lawrence Legare, Unification of the Armed Forces (Washington: Chief of Military 
History, Department of the Army, 1958), 18. 
from the Secretary of the Navy did not specify direct support, he would not participate 
in the campaign.4 When Brigadier General Izard's forces arrived in Niagara in 
October 1814 to buttress the American positions on the Canadian side, he could not 
expand his operations further into Canada in part because "Chauncey would not offer 
the needed naval support."5 
2.     The Civil War 
Although naval forces could "establish a local blockade and seize relatively 
minor settlements pretty much at will,...the active cooperation of the...army was 
absolutely essential in taking well-garrisoned strongholds."6 Control of the coast and 
of the Mississippi would require effective joint action. This did not always occur. 
After taking New Orleans in February 1862, the Union naval force under 
Rear Admiral Farragut continued up river. In the meantime, the Western Flotilla was 
fighting down the river from Cairo, Illinois. In June 1862, the combined naval forces 
met at Vicksburg, the last remaining Confederate stronghold. Farragut, unable to take 
Vicksburg without land forces, requested assistance from Major General Halleck, 
commanding the Western Department. Halleck, preoccupied with the aftermath of 
Shiloh, ignored Farragut's request. The opportunity to take permanent control of the 
4
 Legare, 16-18. 
5
 Hassler, 94. 
6 Kenneth Hagan, This People's Naw (New York: Free Press, 1991), 169. 
7 
Mississippi was lost, and the Confederates were able to fortify Vicksburg.7 After Major 
General Grant relieved Halleck later that month, a coordinated attack was planned, 
and Vicksburg fell to a Union siege on 4 July 1863. 
In mid-1863, Charleston was one of the few Confederate ports still open. 
Naval operations alone could not reduce the harbor defenses, so the Navy asked for 
Army support.8 The Navy wanted to take the city itself, but the Army was content to 
take the outlying islands and isolate the city, especially since Chief of Staff Halleck 
"never thought Charleston - or the fleet -- of any importance."9 Operations against 
the barrier islands were successful, but the Army would not provide the forces needed 
to actually take the city, since this was not important to them. During the siege, both 
services independently planned assaults to take Fort Sumter on 7 September 1863. 
After learning of the Navy plan, Brigadier General Gillmore suggested a coordinated 
attack. Rear Admiral Dahlgren insisted that a naval officer command the operation. 
Gillmore decided that cooperation would not be possible and cancelled the Army 
attack. The naval attack proceeded, and failed with heavy losses.10 
By the end of 1864, Wilmington, North Carolina, was the only remaining 
Confederate port. The Navy was anxious to close the port, but the Army felt 
compelled by political constraints to "cover" Washington against any moves the 
Confederates might make. As a result, the Army only sent 6,500 lightly armed, 
7
 Allan Millet and Peter Maslowski, For The Common Defense (New York: Free Press, 1984), 179-180. 
8
 Rowena Reed, Cnmhined Operations in the Civil War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 297. 
9
 Reed, 314. 
10
 Legare, 31-32. 
8 
inexperienced troops instead of the 10,000 veterans requested by the Navy.11 In 
December 1864, a joint assault on Fort Fisher was launched. But the light armament 
of the Army forces required an unsupported naval bombardment, in spite of the lesson 
from Charleston that naval bombardment alone would not reduce land fortifications. 
The assault was aborted when the Army forces determined that the bombardment had 
failed to significantly affect the fort.12 
3.     Santiago de Cuba (1898) 
The Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War provided a striking 
example of poor interservice cooperation. As war broke out, the Spanish fleet sailed 
for Cuba. Rear Admiral Sampson, commander of the North Atlantic Squadron, was 
ordered to attack Admiral Cervera at Santiago, but the extremely narrow, mined 
entrance to the harbor and the Spanish forts overlooking its entrance prevented the 
U.S. forces from engaging Cervera.13 Sampson requested Army assistance to capture 
the forts. This would allow the Navy to sweep the mines, enter the harbor and destroy 
Cervera's fleet. 
Major General Shatter and a 17,000-man expeditionary force were ordered 
to Cuba. Shatter and Sampson conferred to plan the campaign. Sampson saw the 
taking of the forts as the only objective of the land operations. Shaffer's orders listed 
two tasks: taking the garrison at Santiago and assisting the Navy. Shafter decided 
to attack the city and ignore the Navy, to the extent of not asking for assistance during 
11
 Reed, 331-32. 
12
 Reed, 352. 
13
 Hagan, 223-224. 
bloody attacks at El Caney and San Juan Hill, which were well within the range of 
naval guns waiting offshore. During the siege of Santiago, Shaffer urged Sampson 
to enter the bay and attack the city from behind. Sampson agreed to do so if the forts 
at the entrance were taken, but Shafter claimed that he needed all of his forces for 
the siege. As a result, the Navy did not participate in the taking of Santiago, and 
Shafter did not allow any naval officer to sign the surrender document.14 
C.     THE JOINT BOARD AND THE SEARCH FOR UNITY OF COMMAND 
Problems with these operations can be attributed to the failure of the services, 
and especially their local commanders, to agree on campaign goals and means of 
execution. This problem was aggravated by the lack of any mechanism to regulate 
interactions between the services short of the President, who was usually unwilling 
to intervene. The need for sub-cabinet level direction of operations involving both 
Army and Navy forces had been identified before the Spanish-American War; it was 
a motivating factor for the formation of the Joint Army-Navy Board in 1903.15 
The Joint Board consisted of four officers each from the Army General Staff and 
the Navy General Board. Before World War I, its record was undistinguished. Instead 
of resolving problems with joint operations, it largely confined itself to ceremonial and 
other administrative issues.  In 1907, the Board's inability to reach consensus on a 
14
 Millet & Maslowski, 278-281. 
15
 Hagan, 207. 
10 
contingency plan for a possible war with Japan enraged President Theodore 
Roosevelt.16 The Board also fell into disfavor with President Wilson,17 and it lay 
moribund throughout World War I.18 
The Board was reconstituted in July 1919. Its members were designated by 
billet: the Army Chief of Staff and his operations and war plans deputies, and the 
Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant CNO and the head of the naval war planning 
division. A Joint Planning Committee was established, consisting of three officers 
from each war plans division.19 This composition gave the Board the authority to 
devise plans acceptable to both services and to mandate their execution. But this 
was not the case. Decisions of the board required consensus, which was often 
impossible. The presidents and the service secretaries of this period showed little 
interest in war planning, so there was no voice to resolve disputes. 
One of the most contentious issues that confronted the Joint Board throughout 
its existence was command of joint operations. These discussions focused on the 
concepts of "mutual cooperation" and "paramount interest." Mutual cooperation 
assumed complete independence of command, with each commander directing his 
forces to complete his own service's mission, supporting the efforts of the other 
service if possible. This had been the de facto mode of interaction between Army and 
Navy commanders throughout U.S. history.    Paramount interest also assumed 
16
 Hagan, 238-239. 
17
 Miller, 22. 
18
 Miller, 14. 
19
 American Wav. 245, and Miller, 83-84. 
11 
independence of command, though the missions of one service could be subordinated 
to support the other if the situation warranted. Although the idea of unified command 
received some discussion, and even occasional support, it was largely rejected by the 
Joint Board.20 This view ignored the fact that Admiral Sampson and General Shatter 
could neither determine paramount interest nor exercise mutual cooperation. 
By 1938, the Joint Board eliminated paramount interest and mandated mutual 
cooperation. Unified command would only occur: 
(1) When ordered by the President; or 
(2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the 
Secretary of the Navy; or 
(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation 
requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service 
that shall exercise such command.21 
This structure remained unchanged through the rest of World War II, though it did not 
prevent the establishment of joint and combined commands in all theaters.22 But 
neither did it provide a framework that would ensure effective interoperability. 
D.     WORLD WAR II 
The experiences of World War II show that mutual cooperation did not ensure 
effective interoperability. But they also show that unified command in the theaters did 
not, by itself, solve the problems that had plagued previous joint operations. 
20
 C. Kenneth Allard, Command. Control and the Common Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990), 94-96. 
21
 Joint Action of the Armv and Naw (1938), quoted in Legare, 162. 
22
 Legare, 163. 
12 
1.      Pearl Harbor 
Hawaii in 1941 should have been an superior example of effective mutual 
cooperation. Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet, and Lieutenant General 
Short, commander of the Hawaiian department, were close friends.23 But their 
personal relationship did not ensure an effective joint defense plan. Tasks were 
apportioned among the services, and each assumed that the other would fulfill its 
responsibilities. 
This did not occur. Each service took actions affecting the defense of 
Hawaii without informing the other. The Navy was to provide long-range aerial 
reconnaissance. When the war warning message of 27 November 1941 was sent by 
the CNO, Kimmel concluded that available naval forces could not provide 360° of 
effective surveillance, so he decided not to provide any reconnaissance at all. Kimmel 
did not inform Short that there were any problems with conducting the 
reconnaissance, much less that it would not even be attempted.24 But neither did 
Short, directed to "undertake . . . reconnaissance"25 by the Army's war warning 
message, attempt to verify what measures were being taken.26 
23
 Gordon W. Prange, et al, Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), 376. 
24
 Prange, 439-41. 
25
 Prange, 651. 
26
 Prange, 365. 
13 
The Army was to install and operate a radar net and conduct inshore air 
patrols.27 On 7 December, the radar net was only operating from 0400 to 0800, and 
there was no effective means for the Signal Corps' radar operators to alert and direct 
the Air Corps' pursuit pilots.28 But the Navy was not informed about any problems, 
and Kimmel "presumed that the steps necessary to make the . . . radar. . . effective 
had been taken."29 Kimmel's subordinates had few expectations, if any, from the 
radar net; many of them did not know of its existence.30 
The services' alert structures were inconsistent. Both had three levels, but 
applied them differently. For the Navy, Condition 1 was the highest alert. Naval 
procedure was to go to Condition 1 first, relaxing to lower levels if the situation 
warranted. For the Army, Alert Number 1 was the lowest alert, and Army policy was 
to institute the lowest level alert deemed necessary for a given situation.31 In fact, 
Kimmel, upon hearing that the Army had gone to Alert Number 1, assumed that they 
had gone on full alert;32 his chief of staff believed that the Army had only one type of 
alert.33 
27
 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pparl Harbor: Warninn and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 
5. 
28
 Wohlstetter, 8-10. 
29
 Congress, Hearings before the Joint Committed on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th 
Congress, 1946, 6:2586, quoted in Prange, 447-48. 
30
 Wohlstetter, 28. 
31
 Wohlstetter, 403-4. 
32
 Wohlstetter, 47. 
33
 Prange, 447. 
14 
Among the intelligence organizations, only the Army's Hawaiian 
Department G-2 and 14th Naval District Counterespionage Officers had regular 
contact.34 Operational liaison between the 14th Naval District and the Hawaiian 
Department consisted of one Lieutenant Harold Burr, "a bright fellow, very loyal, very 
willing, but not a very experienced officer."35 The congressional investigation 
concluded that: 
there was a complete failure in Hawaii of effective Army-Navy' "j?^"*innj*« 
critical period November 27 to December 7. There was but little cooperation 
an* nö integraln of Army and Navy facilities and efforts for defense^ Neither 
of the responsible commanders knew what the other was doing w.th respect to 
essential military activities.36 
Each service's plan assumed that the other was doing its part and that mutual 
cooperation could be relied upon to defend Hawaii, but there was no routine 
interaction between Army and Navy forces. As a result, there was no way to test the 
plans. "Mutual cooperation," without routine interaction, could not produce an effective 
joint operation. 
Unity of command was eventually instituted, but only on an ad hoc basis 
through 1942. A JCS paper entitled "Unified Command for Joint Operations" was 
approved in April 1943 after nine months of study and delay. Even this paper did not 
require unified command, and only provided "broad principles governing the selection 
of a joint commander, his relation to his subordinate commanders, the scope of h, 
34
 Wohlstetter, 36. 
^Prange, 391. 
3« congress, Joint Committee on the .nvestigation of the Pear, Harbor Attack. luuligtflguiUfatJ 
Haröar^tLü, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 20 July 1946, Report, 156. 
15 
responsibility, and the provision of a staff to assist him."37 The need for U.S. forces 
to develop concepts of joint command was intensified by the need to operate with 
British forces, who already operated under such principles.38 
2.      Amphibious Warfare and Close Air Support in the Pacific Theater 
Unity of command did not ensure unity of purpose among the services. 
Neither did it ensure interoperability; only months of costly errors pointed the way 
toward solutions. The war in the Pacific, and close air support of ground troops in 
particular, illustrate that unity of command did not, by itself, promote unity of purpose 
or interoperability of forces. 
The Solomons campaign is often cited as an example of interoperability 
during World War II. Forces from all services supported each other, and all land 
based air assets were under unified command. But even here, there were problems. 
Unified command was instituted because little support was forthcoming from the 
United States; survival mandated coordinating the few available assets.39 The carrier- 
based air forces were not under this command; they were only committed to the 
operation until two days after the invasion of Guadalcanal because their commander, 
Vice Admiral Fletcher, felt it was unsafe to remain. After this, the land-based forces 
were left on their own.40 
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Close air support of ground troops was also a problem. The Marines 
developed close air support doctrine in the 1920s and 1930s and employed it in 
expeditionary duty in Nicaragua.41 But Marine pilots were stationed elsewhere, and 
the burden of close air support often fell on Navy and Army pilots who had little or no 
training in such tactics. They learned, but their effectiveness was reduced while they 
did.42 
E.      NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 
World War II showed that command of joint operations by mutual cooperation 
left much to be desired. Although the command structures and operating techniques 
developed during the war were effective in defeating the enemy, changes were clearly 
required to codify the ad hoc procedures that made victory possible. 
The first reorganization was the National Security Act of 1947. Its proponents 
advocated unifying the armed forces into a new Department of National Defense, and 
demoting the service secretaries to Assistant Secretaries. Congressional opponents, 
fearing a "'Prussian' military centralization," prevented unification. Instead, the act 
established a Secretary of Defense to coordinate the activities of the Departments of 
41
 Isley & Crawl, 33. 
42
 Isley & Crawl, 508-09. 
17 
War, Navy, and a newly created Department of the Air Force, all of which would retain 
cabinet rank. It also codified the Joint Chiefs of Staff.43 The Joint Army-Navy Board, 
moribund since the establishment of the JCS, was formally abolished in 1947.44 
Under this system, the Secretary of Defense was to oversee the operation of the 
military establishment, but had little authority to enforce his will.45 The Hoover 
Commission, appointed to find ways to improve the national security process, 
supported increased centralization. Congress agreed and amended the Act in 1949. 
The amendment created a Department of Defense, and subordinated the three service 
secretariats to the Defense Secretary. A non-voting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff was also established.46 Again, command structure was seen as the tool to 
restrain service parochialism and, it was thought, to enhance the national defense. 
F.      KOREA 
The Korean conflict showed that stronger joint command structures did not 
improve interoperability. It soon became apparent that the lessons learned during 
World War II had largely been forgotten. There was no joint plan to defend Korea.47 
43
 Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy gnd Policy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 374.  Hereafter cited as American Way. 
44
 Legare, 221. 
45
 American Way. 376. 
46
 Russell Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 494-95.  Hereafter 
cited as Army. 
47
 Winnifield & Johnson, 53. 
18 
Control and utilization of air forces (including naval aviation) were problems 
throughout the war. A Joint Operations Center was established in July 1950 by the 
Fifth Air Force to control air operations. But Army organizational problems prevented 
its participation until the spring of 1951. The Marines quickly established a liaison 
officer in the JOC and allowed JOC to task the 1st Marine Air Wing - except when 
it was directly supporting the 1st Marine Division.48 The Navy insisted on retaining 
control of carrier based air; its liaison officer "had no authority to commit Task Force 
77 to a desired action." One week before the cessation of hostilities,49 the 
commanders of the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet finally agreed to fully 
integrate carrier aircraft into the joint organization.50 Even within this framework, 
operational planning consisted mainly of dividing the peninsula into sectors of 
responsibility for each service or component (Far East Air Forces Bomber Command 
and Fifth Air Force were allocated separate regions). Unfortunately, as Winnifield and 
Johnson point out: 
the urgency of striking the target, service-specific hardware limitations, or sortie 
availability meant that one service could not do the job itself. All that such 
partitioning did was to compensate for the absence of joint service procedures 
and plans for the effective utilization of the airpower within the theater.51 
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Air Force close air support, especially at the beginning of the war, was 
"handicapped because [it] had neglected tactical air support while concentrating on 
readiness to deliver the atomic bomb, and the Fifth Air Force and Eighth Army in 
Japan in particular had not carried out exercises in air-ground coordination."52 Navy- 
Marine definitions of such terms as "close support" and "deep support" did not agree 
with those of the Air Force, which further complicated coordination.53 Air Force 
communications systems stressed high capacity between central command and 
operating bases, but "limited provision for tactical communication at the scene of 
action." Navy and Marine communications had the opposite emphasis. As a result, 
interservice coordination of assets was inadequate during both mission allocation and 
execution.54 Overall, Winnifield and Johnson evaluate the experiences of Korea as 
a "failure of peacetime and wartime command alike to deal adequately with the 
requirements for truly effective joint operations."55 
G.     DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958 
President Eisenhower enacted Reorganization Proposal 6 in June 1953 to fulfill 
a campaign promise to improve the organization of DoD. This plan strengthened the 
Chairman's authority by allowing him to approve appointments to the Joint Staff and 
52
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gave the service chiefs' JCS duties statutory precedence over their service duties.56 
But this was not sufficient, and Eisenhower proposed another amendment to the 
National Security Act. He introduced the proposal in an address to Congress in which 
he stated that: 
[sjeparate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should 
be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single 
concentrated effort . . . singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of 
service.57 
As passed, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 removed the operational authority 
of the service chiefs, who had previously commanded the unified commanders from 
their services (i.e., Atlantic and Pacific Commands under the CNO and European 
Command under the Army Chief of Staff). It also expanded the Joint Staff and 
permitted the Chairman to vote on issues affecting the JCS. 58 
H.      CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH INTEROPERABILITY 
1.     Vietnam 
Many of the lessons learned in Korea had been forgotten by the time of 
the Vietnam conflict. The Air Force had once again abandoned close air support in 
favor of more "strategic" roles for theater air forces.   It only had 23 0-1 spotter 
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aircraft,59 and their radios were incompatible with Army helicopter and ground force 
radios. Instead, they carried an infantryman's portable radio as an interim measure 
for nearly two years until a permanent radio with adequate range could be installed.60 
After the Tonkin Gulf crisis, a lack of common procedures among the Army and Air 
Force delayed improvements to communications facilities between bases in 
Thailand.61 
As in Korea, the Marines retained command of their air forces. Until 1967, 
this was not a problem, as the Marines controlled I Corps and the Army operated in 
the other three corps areas. But as the Army moved north, the Air Force followed, 
and coordination problems increased. During the defense of Khe Sanh in 1968, 
separate Air Force and Marine control systems caused both services to attack some 
targets, sometimes simultaneously, while others were ignored. After the 1st Marine 
Air Wing failed to provide adequate support to Army divisions in the northern I Corps 
area, General Westmoreland argued to the Joint Chiefs that a single unified 
commander for tactical aviation should be established. The Marine Corps 
Commandant objected on doctrinal grounds. The Army Chief of Staff would not 
support Westmoreland because he feared setting a precedent that would allow the Air 
Force to take control of Army helicopters. As a compromise, Commander in Chief, 
Pacific, gave 7th Air Force "mission direction" over Marine air assets in I Corps. 7th 
AF interpreted this as operational control, while the Marines assumed two exceptions: 
59
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that they could obtain immediate strikes in air-ground team operations, and that they 
could appeal 7th AF decisions over COMUSMACV directly to CINCPAC. In effect, 
this negated any operational control of Marine aircraft.62 
The relationship between the Navy and Air Force in Vietnam was much the 
same as in Korea. Route packages were established that delineated zones for each 
service to operate in. Although successive 7th Air Force commanders called for unity 
of command of air assets, there is little evidence of strained Air Force - Navy 
relations. This is because the route package system delivered satisfactory results 
without the need to address fundamental differences.63 
2.      Iran Rescue Attempt 
In April 1980, a joint force attempted to rescue the Americans being held 
hostage in the U.S. embassy in Teheran, Iran. After a series of mechanical failures, 
the operation was aborted. During the withdrawal, a helicopter and a C-130 tanker 
collided. Both aircraft were destroyed, and the other helicopters were abandoned 
intact, with weapons and classified documents still aboard.64 The investigation of the 
incident revealed that established joint task force procedures were ignored in favor of 
an ad hoc command and staff system.65 Since the special operations forces of the 
various services had not operated together in many years, they had developed 
different operating procedures and philosophies. Joint task force procedures existed, 
62
 Winnifield & Johnson, 70-74. 
63
 Winnifield & Johnson, 77-78. 
64
 Paul B. Ryan, The Iran Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 91. 
65
 Ryan, 21. 
23 
but had not been practiced. Consequently, the service component commanders had 
different interpretations of the mission plan and the procedures to be carried out in 
case of problems. A rehearsal would have pointed out these differences, but concern 
for secrecy precluded one.66 
3.      Grenada 
In October 1983, Operation Urgent Fury was mounted against the 
Caribbean island nation of Grenada. The operation was ultimately successful, but 
several problems indicate that a lack of interoperability hampered the mission. The 
maps that the Marines carried had a different grid system than those carried by the 
Army,67 resulting in several instances of fire support being directed onto friendly 
positions.68 Army units were unable to talk directly to naval air assets, since their 
radio frequencies were different. In the initial phase of the operation, Army fire 
support requests had to go to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, then via satellite to the 
naval commander.69 According to Marine Corps Commandant Mundy, "while the 
mission was accomplished, it is generally agreed that we failed miserably in achieving 
unity of effort and were not as effective as we should have been. ■i70 
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4.     Conclusions 
The provisions of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act did not prepare the 
armed forces to conduct integrated joint operations. In extended operations, as in 
Korea and Vietnam, differences in equipment were eventually overcome and 
differences in doctrine were accommodated or made irrelevant by the division of 
responsibilities. In Grenada, similar problems were inconvenient, but the 
overwhelming superiority of U.S. forces ensured success in spite of problems with 
interoperability. In the Iran hostage rescue attempt, however, problems with 
interoperability had more tragic results. In all cases, the services did not incorporate 
the lessons from these operations in their later planning, and later repeated similar 
mistakes. The command structures imposed by the 1958 Act did not create effectively 
interoperable forces, as President Eisenhower had hoped. 
I.       GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986 
By 1985, Congress was convinced that interservice rivalry and parochialism 
were preventing the armed forces from operating as a team, and that encouraging 
"jointness" was the key to reversing this trend.71 The result of the congressional 
debate was the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The Act made several changes 
designed to enhance the capabilities of joint entities. The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff was designated as the principal military advisor to the National 
Command Authority. A Vice Chairman was created to relieve the Chairman of some 
71
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routine administrative tasks.72 The unified commanders were specifically given 
operational control of the forces within their areas of responsibility, and were given 
limited input into their budgets.73 Finally, requirements for joint officer assignment and 
education were established in order to ensure that quality officers would be assigned 
to joint and unified staff duty and that they would be well prepared for their tasks.74 
J.      DESERT STORM 
Operation Desert Storm was the first test of the structures put into place by 
Goldwater-Nichols. In many ways, the provisions of the Act were vindicated. The 
unified Central Command executed a complex operation. But there were indications 
that interoperability was still a problem. The most glaring example was the air tasking 
order (ATO), which had to be physically taken to each aircraft carrier because the 
Navy did not have the communications hardware needed for its electronic 
transmission.75 The Navy recognized this problem as early as October 1988, but did 
not procure the necessary communications equipment, despite the effective integration 
of Navy aircraft into the JFACC concept using borrowed Air Force equipment during 
the 1989 Solid Shield exercise.76 Navy fighter aircraft also lacked target identification 
(IFF) equipment needed to satisfy the requirement in the rules of engagement for dual 
72
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phenomenology identification of air contacts prior to engagement. The result was that 
Navy fighters could not be used in certain CAP stations.77 Four years after the 
passage of this so-called revolution in joint affairs, serious barriers to interoperabilty 
remained. The failure of GNA to reduce service autonomy meant that the problems 
that produced non-interoperable forces would continue. 
Winnifield & Johnson, 115. 
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III. THE REAL PROBLEM: LACK OF ROUTINE INTERACTION 
Defense reorganizations were intended to improve interoperability by creating 
centralized command structures that would enforce unity of effort. The record of joint 
operations in the last fifty years shows that interoperability problems have continued 
despite increasing command centralization. 
Defense reorganizations have not improved interoperability because they only 
treated a symptom of the actual problem: the lack of routine interaction between the 
services. This chapter reviews the statutory and historical factors that minimized 
interaction and how this created autonomous services with separate cultures. It 
describes how lack of interaction caused the services to disagree on campaign goals 
and to devise coincidentally incomparable procedures and equipment. Finally, it 
shows how centralizing command structures has not increased routine interaction 
between the services and how this presents continued impediments to interoperability. 
A.     HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM 
Statutory divisions and separate roles and missions have largely prevented 
routine interaction between the services throughout U.S. history. In spite of unified 
command and centralized administration created by defense reorganizations, the 
services retain much of the autonomy that has characterized their relationship since 
the establishment of the Navy Department in 1798. This marked the beginning of the 
statutory autonomy of the services. From this point until the end of World War II, 
28 
Army and Navy administration were entirely separate from one another, and their 
dealings with Congress were handled by separate Military and Naval Affairs 
Committees.78 
Defense reorganizations have been offered as a means to enhance 
interoperability by reducing service autonomy. Unfortunately, none of the 
reorganizations to date have done so. Although the services secretaries have been 
demoted from cabinet rank, the services still organize, train, and equip their own 
forces.79 Although budget approval authority has been given to the Secretary of 
Defense, "the generals and admirals ... not only [draw] up the basic document but 
[defend and justify] it throughout each phase of the congressional appropriations 
process."80 Even the unified commanders, finally given explicit operational command 
of their forces, command these forces through dual-hatted component commanders 
who also answer to (and are funded by) their individual services. The effect of the 
defense reorganizations has been to install joint structures at the national command 
level while only marginally reducing the statutory separation of the services. 
The missions of the individual services throughout U.S. history have also served 
to minimize interaction between the services. This lack of interaction was further 
encouraged by congressional parsimony, which mandated small force structures. 
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Separate missions made interaction seem unnecessary; the far-flung commitments of 
the minuscule forces meant that none were available to develop and practice joint 
capabilities that seemed far removed from their normal missions. 
The predominant mission of the Army has been constabulary duty. In the thirty 
years following the War of 1812, the Army fought two campaigns and several smaller 
actions against the Indians, as well as policing the rapidly expanding frontier.81 
Although nominally organized into regiments, it typically was stationed in companies 
or platoons. In 1850, its 10,763 men were scattered among over one hundred posts.82 
After the Civil War, the Army returned to its pre-war mission, its size reduced from 
1,000,516 in May 1865 to 25,000 by June 1874.83 Coast defense, one area where 
interaction with the Navy would be expected, was largely ignored. Construction of 
fortifications lagged far behind Army aspirations, and only 151 of the 2,362 artillery 
pieces recommended in an 1885 study were in place by 1898.84 
The Spanish-American War left the United States with a worldwide empire. The 
Army was tasked with additional constabulary responsibilities, especially in the 
Philippines. Congress was finally convinced in 1916 that these new responsibilities 
required increased force levels, but the increases were tied as much to the threat of 
U.S. involvement in World War I as to peacetime needs.85  After a wartime peak of 
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over 3 million, budgets kept Army force levels at about 130,000 through the mid- 
19305.86 This was about one-quarter of Army requests, and about half of the force 
that Congress authorized.87 
Even post-World War II Army missions have been mainly single service. 
Beginning once again with constabulary duty in Japan and Germany, their role 
became one of forward defense against a Soviet bloc attack in these countries and 
Korea. This mission only depended on the Navy for defense of resupply shipping, 
which required little direct contact. The Army also needed Air Force support for air 
resupply, which required a relationship only slightly closer than that with the Navy, and 
close air support, which the previous chapter showed was a low priority item for the 
Air Force. 
The predominant mission of the Navy has been the protection of U.S. shipping 
and freedom of navigation. As with the Army, the Navy has carried out its mission 
using small groups of widely scattered forces throughout most of its history. Until the 
1880s, the Navy typically operated in squadrons of two or three vessels under the 
command of the senior captain, with six permanent squadrons assigned by 1830.88 
After the Civil War, the Navy returned to its role of protecting overseas commerce. 
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Its wartime fleet of 671 ships was reduced to 103.89 Lack of manning hampered the 
ability to deploy these ships; by 1877, there were only 7,012 enlisted men in the entire 
Navy.90 
The Navy started a building campaign after 1880, but Congress only relented 
after the Navy's inferiority to smaller powers became clear, and it was less than the 
Navy thought necessary. The reason for the buildup, however, was to counter the 
fleets of other world powers on the high seas, not to support land forces. This 
emphasis on engagements on the high seas continued through the late 1980s, with 
the threat of the traditional Great Powers replaced by that of the Soviet Navy. This 
role required little or no interaction with the other services. 
The development of military aircraft formed a large part of the debate concerning 
the relationship between land and naval forces after World War I. But naval aviation 
was firmly wedded to the Navy, and what would become the Army Air Corps chose 
to focus on heavy bombers that would supposedly make other forms of warfare 
obsolete.91 As a result, the interaction between the services that the development of 
aircraft might have encouraged did not occur. After its establishment as a separate 
service, the Air Force continued this detachment from the other services. Its devotion 
to intercontinental bombers and missiles, and to the fighters and interceptors that 
would defend them, minimized interaction with the other services.  The hesitation of 
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the Air Force to embrace the close air support mission has already been documented; 
its relationship with the Navy has been no closer. Although transport and close air 
support require some relationship with the Army and, to a much lesser extent, the 
Navy and Marine Corps, its preferred missions have required little interaction with the 
other services. 
B.  THE RESULT: SEPARATE SERVICE CULTURES 
In Organizational Culture and Leadership, Edgar Schein defines organizational 
culture as the 
pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed by a given 
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaption and internal 
integration - that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore, 
to be taught as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those 
problems.92 
Each of the armed services has developed what this thesis will call "service culture" 
to evaluate its history and to act as the basis for decisions concerning the training and 
equipping of its forces. 
The Navy's service culture has its roots in the concept of independent command 
at sea, reinforced by the single-ship and small squadron deployments characteristic 
of the Navy's first century. The Navy found its philosophical underpinning in the 
writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. His advocacy of "control of the sea by decisive 
defeat of the enemy fleet"93 motivated the naval buildup that began in the late 19th 
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century. Although Mahan stated that control of the sea would permit power projection 
ashore94, his vision of sea control did not require the participation of land forces. 
Mahan's writings were validated by the fleet actions in the Pacific during World War 
II, and can be seen as the foundation for the Maritime Strategy of the late 1980s. 
The Army's service culture is largely based on the writings of Clausewitz and 
Jomini, and focuses on the "destruction of the enemy army and effective control over 
the means required to bring this objective about."95 Its experiences in World War II 
emphasized the need for effective combined arms operations, as opposed to the 
Navy's concept of independent command,96 and formed the basis for its Air-Land 
Battle concept. 
The Air Force culture is based on the writings of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell. 
It asserts that air power is the decisive form of warfare that places other forms of 
warfare at an inherent disadvantage. Consequently, the Air Force has focused its 
attention on heavy bombers, the fighters and interceptors that allow the bombers to 
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C.     THE PRODUCT: NON-INTEROPERABLE FORCES 
Allard points out that the philosophies that are the basis of each service's culture 
"contradict the others in a number of important respects, and ... no general theory 
has yet been discovered that is capable of reconciling them."98 The results of this 
problem are predictable and well documented. First, the services have developed 
different views of how campaigns should be conducted. This problem has existed 
throughout U.S. history. In the War of 1812, Commodore Chauncey could not agree 
with the land commanders that naval support was needed to win the campaign. In 
the Civil War, Major General Halleck would not provide the land forces that could have 
taken Vicksburg in 1862. In the Spanish-American War, Rear Admiral Sampson and 
Major General Shatter could not agree on whether the land or the naval battle had 
priority. Since World War II, such disputes between the services have been 
considered a part of "interservice rivalry," especially where they involve competition 
for funds. The conflicts between the Air Force and the Navy concerning bombers vs. 
supercarriers and control of nuclear weapons are perhaps the most vivid examples 
of post-WWII disputes over the correct means to conduct campaigns. Disputes 
between service definitions of close air support in Korea and the continuing dispute 
between the Air Force and the Marine Corps over control of Marine air assets also 
illustrate the continuing nature of the problem. 
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A second result of contradictory service cultures is incompatible equipment and 
procedures that act as barriers to interoperability. Each service designs equipment 
for the tactical and operational environments envisioned by its respective service staff. 
The single-service operational experience upon which service cultures are based has 
produced equipment that is incompatible with that of other services, since these 
systems were not designed for use in joint operations." The services are similarly 
responsible for training their own forces, and service culture determines what training 
its forces will receive. Different service cultures have produced incompatible doctrine 
and procedures just as it has produced incompatible communications equipment or 
ammunition. 
The history of the U.S. armed forces provides many examples of equipment and 
procedural barriers to interoperability. Early U.S. history has fewer of these problems 
because lower technology armaments and smaller spans of control allowed them to 
be resolved in the field. For example, at the Battle of Mobile Bay in 1864, 
incompatible Army and Navy signal flag systems were resolved by stationing an Army 
signals officer on the bridge of Admiral Farragufs flagship.100 As technology 
improved, however, equipment became more complex and tactical and operational 
procedures became more closely tied to this newer equipment. Differences became 





D.      FLAWED DIAGNOSIS: COMMAND STRUCTURES 
Most proposed solutions to interoperability problems have focused on command 
structures. It was thought that unified command of operations and policy would 
encourage the services to abandon their single-service perspectives and embrace 
jointness in their planning. This did not occur because none of these reorganizations 
altered the actual reason for interoperability problems: the lack of interaction between 
the services. 
Previous defense reorganizations have not substantially reduced the autonomy 
of the services. Despite the unified command structures that have been 
superimposed on the services, the day-to-day operations of the services require little 
interaction between them. This has served to reinforce the single-service perspective 
of each of their service cultures. Since their planning is based on these cultural 
norms, equipment design and personnel training has continued to emphasize single- 
service capability at the expense of interoperability. Since the national leadership has 
been unable or unwilling to reduce service autonomy, another path must be found if 
interoperability is to be improved. 
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IV.  HOW ROUTINE INTERACTION IMPROVES INTEROPERABILITY 
Increasing routine interaction between the services is the key to improved 
interoperability. Units and individuals from each service that encounter those from 
other services in their day-to-day operations will see joint operations as the rule rather 
than the exception. Different philosophical concepts will be required to explain this 
experience. In other words, service culture will change. Since interaction will be 
considered to be normal, interoperability will be an important consideration in 
equipment design and doctrinal development. Interoperability will be improved by the 
same process that was its biggest stumbling block. 
This chapter analyzes some successful joint operations, emphasizing how 
interaction enhanced interoperability. The benefits of increased routine interaction are 
discussed in greater detail. Finally, some means to increase routine interaction will 
be proposed and compared to provisions of GNA. 
A.     SUCCESSFUL JOINT OPERATIONS 
There have, of course, been successful joint operations. Understanding how 
and why they succeeded provides lessons for how to increase interaction and improve 
interoperability. 
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1. The War of 1812 
Success on the Great Lakes required effective joint action. Commodore 
Chauncey's refusal to support land operations around Lake Ontario presents a stark 
contrast for a much more successful campaign against longer odds on Lake Erie. 
Brigadier General Harrison was ordered to retake Detroit and attack southern Ontario. 
Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry's mission was to take control of Lake Erie. 
But the British were using the lake to supply their land forces, which prevented 
Harrison from completing his mission, and Perry had insufficient manpower to build 
or man his planned squadron. Harrison provided troops to Perry, who built his 
squadron and defeated the British. Harrison was then able to recapture Detroit, after 
which Perry supported Harrison in an immediate attack into Canada. The loss of their 
naval force compelled the British to retreat,101 and Detroit was secured for the 
remainder of the war. 
2. The Civil War 
In January 1862, Brigadier General Grant, Major General Halleck's deputy 
in the western theater, was advancing up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. He 
planned to take Forts Henry and Donelson with support from Flag Officer Andrew 
Foote. Halleck, though concerned about detaching Grant's force from his center and 
skeptical about the effectiveness of naval gunfire, grudgingly approved.102 By mid- 
February, both forts had fallen, forcing the Confederates to abandon Nashville. 
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The failed assault on Fort Fisher, North Carolina, in December 1864 was 
discussed in Chapter II. Only one month later, however, the situation had dramatically 
changed. Major General Sherman had completed his "march to the sea," and wanted 
to continue through the Carolinas. Grant was determined that Sherman should not 
run out of stores, and decided that Wilmington was the logical place from which to 
support Sherman. The Navy was only too willing to cooperate.103 A well-outfitted 
force was sent for the attack. Coordination with the Navy was effective. The limits 
of naval gunfire on shore targets, learned in Charleston in 1862 but forgotten during 
the first attack on Fort Fisher, were recognized and compensated for. A successful 
attack was mounted in January, 1865. Wilmington was taken, closing the port to 
raiders and blockade runners and ensuring support for Sherman.104 
3.      World War II 
World War II began with a tragic example of the inability of the services to 
conduct joint operations: Pearl Harbor. Other problems soon became apparent, such 
as the unfamiliarity of the other services with amphibious doctrine, the Air Corps' 
inattention to close air support of ground forces, and differences over the proper use 
of air power between the Navy and the Air Corps as well as between the Air Corps 
and the rest of the Army. As the war progressed, the interaction that war forced on 
the services ensured that problems were specifically identified, and the need to 
overcome these problems ensured that solutions were found. 
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The Cactus Air Force is an excellent example of how interaction can 
produce improvements in interoperability. The beginning of the Solomons campaign 
found Marine Lieutenant General Vandegrift on Guadalcanal with only a small number 
of Navy and Marine aircraft, augmented by Army Air Corps fighters and light bombers. 
These forces were of inadequate strength to operate independently, especially since 
their small numbers did not allow the tactics of any of the services to be employed 
effectively. Vandegrift saw that the only chance to employ these forces effectively 
was to place them under unified command. This marked the birth of the Air Solomons 
Command, called the Cactus Air Force after the code name for Guadalcanal. The 
Cactus Air Force devised tactics that best utilized their available forces, but required 
modification of the normal tactics for most of the aircraft types. Even as more aircraft 
finally arrived later in 1942, the Air Solomons Command remained a unified command, 
and would eventually be commanded by Army, Navy and Marine officers.105 
The Southwest Pacific campaign provides another example of how 
interaction allows forces from different services to learn how to operate together. 
Initially, the Army forces were unfamiliar with amphibious assaults, and the Fifth Air 
Force commander, Lieutenant General George Kenney, preferred to cover amphibious 
assaults by attacking enemy air bases with his bombers and keeping his fighters on 
standby alert. By late 1943, however, the Army forces had become so proficient at 
the techniques of amphibious assault that they were able to effectively adapt the 
doctrine to better fit their particular circumstances.106 MacArthur was able to "nudge" 
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Kenney107 into providing "two layers of air cover directly over the landing troops; 
eventually, the Fifth Air Force "became probably the best the best of AAF units in 
rendering tactical support for amphibious assaults."108 
The evolution of the employment of air assets in the European theater also 
illustrates how interaction produces improvements in interoperability. At the beginning 
of the war, the Army ground forces saw aircraft as only a supporting arm. As such, 
they were apportioned piecemeal among the ground force commanders. The Air 
Corps and the Royal Air Force preferred centralization of air assets in order to 
improve the ability for decisive employment. As the North African campaign 
progressed, problems with the piecemeal approach led to concentration of Allied air 
assets under a single command. This allowed the air forces to establish air 
superiority with fighters while attacking enemy bases with bombers. Once this 
superiority had been established, attention would be given to close air support. Army 
Field Service Regulation 100-20 of 21 July 1943 codified this relationship by 
prohibiting the division of command of air assets unless they were "operating 
independently or are isolated by distance or lack of communication."109 
Use of this structure, however, soon showed that the system was not 
responsive to the needs of ground commanders who might need air support to exploit 
success on the ground or assist in ground force defense. As a result, air-ground 
liaison units were developed.    These units were assigned to ground units and 
107
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equipped with radios that enabled them to talk with the fighter-bombers that were 
supporting them. During the breakout from the Normandy invasion, the Ninth Tactical 
Air Command placed Air Support Parties in each division headquarters. Their ability 
to communicate with the close air support aircraft apportioned by 9th TAC 
headquarters "enabled both centralized control and decentralized execution of the 
operations."110 
4.      Operation Thor 
Although there were many problems with joint operations in Vietnam, there 
were successes as well. One of these was Operation Thor, a joint operation 
undertaken in the summer of 1968 that neutralized North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
artillery near the Demilitarized Zone for three years.111 
In the spring of 1968, NVA artillery dominated the area south of the DMZ. 
They regularly shelled the supply lines in the area. Warships would not approach 
within 20 kilometers of the coast. No reconnaissance aircraft had flown over the 
region for several months.112 
Provisional Corps Vietnam (PCV) Artillery created a plan to attack the NVA 
artillery in the region using a combination of artillery (both Army and Marine), naval 
gunfire, fighter-bombers, and B-52s, each of which had complementary capabilities 
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111
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that could compensate for vulnerabilities of the others.   The Air Force would not 
participate unless it controlled the operation. This dispute was not resolved and the 
plan was dropped.113 
Intelligence reported that a two-division attack would occur in July. 
General William Westmoreland ordered that Operation Thor be executed starting on 
7 July. To resolve the command issue, he directed that the Seventh Air Force would 
coordinate the first two days of the attack, which would largely consist of B-52 strikes. 
PCV would control the other five days of the action. Westmoreland committed a 
carrier air group, all naval gunfire support ships, 210 B-52 sorties, and 350 fighter- 
bomber sorties to reinforce the 3rd Marine Division and PCV artillery.114 
Numerous interoperability problems could have made the operation 
impossible. The Air Force argued that incompatible navigation systems would preclude 
their participation; the Marines made changes that resolved the problem. The corps 
ammunition supply officer did not believe that the supply system could support the 
attack. PCV Artillery staff showed him how it could be done, and he developed a 
network of interested people in Air Force transport squadrons, Marine and Army truck 
units, and ammunition depots throughout Vietnam. When NVA artillery destroyed the 
ammunition dump where the Thor ammunition was being stockpiled, C-130s collected 
ammunition from locations throughout Vietnam and delivered it to trucks that took the 
ammunition directly to the batteries. Coordination between artillery and fighter- 




artillery for flak suppression, and they were initially hesitant about their safety.  The 
artillery troops and the pilots met to discuss their concerns and worked out the 
details.115 
Overall, Thor was a spectacular success. Naval gunfire and artillery were 
coordinated to protect bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. Nearly 100 NVA artillery 
weapons were destroyed. U.S. losses were one killed and one wounded. Interaction 
enabled resolution of incompatibilities of equipment and procedures and successful 
execution of an important mission with minimum losses.116 
5.      Lessons for Interoperability 
In each of these cases, interaction provided two main benefits. First, 
interoperability problems were quickly identified. Personnel from each service 
examined the problems, discussed their reservations or lack of understanding 
concerning the equipment or procedures of the other services, and found solutions. 
Second, interaction enabled members of each service to learn about their 
counterparts. The result of interaction was the development of trust between 
members of different services. As each learned the capabilities of the others, they 
began to rely on those capabilities, allowing the most effective use of available 
resources. 
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B.     BENEFITS OF INCREASED ROUTINE INTERACTION 
Many of the "successes" cited in this chapter occurred after the problems had 
been demonstrated in battle, at great cost in lives and resources. Once the services 
returned to their normal peacetime pattern of very limited interaction with the other 
services, the lessons learned during these operations were quickly lost. Increasing 
routine interaction will provide two main benefits for interoperability: testing hardware 
and doctrine compatibility and changing service culture. 
1.     Validation of Doctrine and Hardware Compatibility 
In 1986, the only joint doctrine publications were JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, and JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces.117 After 
the passage of GNA, the Joint Staff J-7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability) 
Directorate was founded, and the Joint Doctrine Center was established. Writing 
began on over 75 new joint publications;118 the current joint publication system 
consists of 192 titles, about 130 of which are currently under development or 
revision.119 
Joint Pub 1 states that doctrine "provides the distilled insights and wisdom 
gained from our collective experience with warfare."120 For most of U.S. history, this 
has been exactly how joint procedures were developed: during actual warfare. Joint 
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Pub 1 then says that this method must change: "we must . . . feed back to the 
doctrine process the lessons learned in training, exercises and operations; and ensure 
that Service doctrine and procedures are consistent."121 
The lack of routine interaction has meant that hardware incompatibilities 
have only been detected during actual operations. Increased routine interaction 
between the services will serve to identify these problems in peacetime and permit 
resolution before they interfere with effective joint combat operations. Once solutions 
are developed, routine interaction allows them to be validated before they fact the test 
of combat. 
2.      Changing Service Culture 
By definition, increased routine interaction will change the experiences of 
the services. The single-service assumptions of service cultures will become 
increasingly anachronistic. If service culture is an explanation of history, increased 
interaction will require cultural assumptions to change; interaction will become the 
norm rather than the exception. Such a change is especially important since past 
defense reorganizations show that service autonomy is unlikely to be reduced in the 
foreseeable future. Since the services will continue to procure and train their forces, 
improving interoperability will require that the service staffs believe that interoperablity 
is important and prepare their forces accordingly. Cultural change is the key to 
accomplishing what organizational change has not. 
121
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C.      MEANS TO PROMOTE INTEROPERABILITY 
1.      Exposure During Initial Training 
Most new members of the military have little idea about how the armed 
forces operate. Basic training teaches recruits the skills that each service deems 
necessary to become part of the institution, including a sense of dedication to their 
country and their branch of service.122 The information gained during initial training 
is especially important since people tend to pay more attention when forming initial 
impressions. After these impressions are formed, they tend to pay less attention to 
subsequent information, especially information that does not conform to their initial 
impressions.123 
The implication of these ideas for interoperability is that a small amount of 
instruction about the capabilities of the other services and how the services interact 
shows new service members that interoperability is an important part of what their 
service does. While much of their time is spent learning service-specific tasks, 
instruction about interoperability puts the purpose for these skills in context. By 
contrast, new service members who have only been trained about their own service 
will continue to see single-service operations as the norm and be less prepared for 
joint operations in which they will participate. 
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2.      Joint Exercises 
Joint exercises have become more frequent in recent years and funding 
of these exercises has held nearly steady despite defense cutbacks.124 However, the 
minuscule budget for joint exercises, the need to develop and maintain service- 
specific skills, and the increased use of simulation during joint exercises125 mean that 
joint exercises will continue to be a small part of routine operations. Since joint 
exercises will be relatively infrequent, the effects of joint exercises on service culture 
depends on previous conditioning concerning the importance of interoperability. 
Without exposure to joint operational concepts during initial training, 
infrequent joint exercises are only an occasional interruption of the normal pattern of 
single-service operations. The infrequent joint exercises are not sufficient to promote 
the importance of interoperability, and service cultures based on single-service 
operations are preserved. 
Personnel who are familiarized with joint operational concepts during initial 
training are conditioned to perceive joint operations as normal. Psychological studies 
have shown that even irregular, infrequent reinforcement is sufficient to preserve 
learned behaviors and attitudes,126 so even the small number of joint exercises that 
most personnel will participate in will effectively reinforce the importance of 
interoperability. 
1241992: CJCS Exercise Program $244.7 M, service funding for joint exercises $100.6 M; 1990: CJCS 
Exercise Program $218.8 M, service funding $103.6 M. James Kitfield, "United We Train," Government 
Executive (November 1992), 48. 
125
 Kitfield, 49. 
126
 Neil R. Carlson, Psychology: The Science of Behavior (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1990), 120. 
49 
A common criticism of joint exercises is that they are mainly command and 
control exercises for high level commanders.127 This emphasis on upper echelon 
command and control problems also overshadows the validation of joint doctrine. It 
is not enough for the component commanders of a joint task force to be able to 
operate together; the units within those components must also be able to operate 
together. If the emphasis of a joint exercise is mainly on command and control of the 
overall effort, "two services participating in a joint exercise 'may actually just be 
exercising next to one another."'128 
One way to prevent this problem would be to conduct command and 
control exercises separately from interoperability exercises. Command and control 
exercises would involve commanders and staffs, making extensive use of simulation. 
These exercises would not waste the time of the operating forces, expend operating 
budgets, or risk environmental damage. In addition, the staffs would not have to wait 
while the units actually maneuvered, leaving more time to develop and practice means 
of command and staff interaction.129 
Interoperability exercises would test how well joint doctrine enables actual 
units in the field to support one another. These would not be large scale exercises, 
nor would they be scenario driven. Command and staff participation would consist 
only of transmitting scripted messages and evaluating the performance of the 
127
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commands involved; no operational or strategic decisions would be taken. If problems 
were found, the exercise could be stopped without disrupting the operations of 
thousands of other personnel engaged in other parts of the exercise. This would 
permit the participants to analyze the causes and propose solutions. The exercise 
could then be restarted at the appropriate point to test the effectiveness of those 
solutions. 
The lower cost means of such exercises means that more of them could 
be conducted. Their improved focus and smaller scale means that the problems with 
joint operations would be more readily apparent and that solutions to these problems 
could be more easily achieved. A larger number of more focused exercises would 
reduce the perception that they were a waste of time with little relevance to actual 
operations. This will make the personnel involved likely to be more concerned with 
the results of joint exercises and more inclined to develop and suggest solutions to 
interoperability problems. Finally, service cultures, as explanations of their 
experiences, will begin to incorporate the importance of interoperability as service 
personnel internalize the idea that joint exercises are an important contributor to their 
missions. 
3.      Centralization and Standardization 
Another way to improve interoperability is to centralize and standardize 
functions throughout the defense establishment. This will create a common frame of 
reference for all of the services which will make interaction seem normal. There are, 
however, certain service-unique functions which might be consolidated for the sake 
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of centralization, instead of improved military capability. This type of change pushes 
interaction faster than might be advisable, and will provoke resistance to other valid 
changes. 
D.     JOINT OFFICER DEVELOPMENT 
An important part of GNA is Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policies, which 
requires the Secretary of Defense to designate "joint specialty" officers, and to 
establish guidelines for their selection, education, training, and assignment. This has 
come to include designation of joint professional military education (JPME) curricula 
and timing within an officer's career, the establishment of a joint duty assignment list 
(JDAL) of billets that satisfy the requirements for joint duty, provisions concerning 
promotion rates of officers assigned to joint and unified staffs relative to their service 
contemporaries as a whole, and a requirement for officers selected to flag and general 
rank to have served in a joint duty billet. 
Prospective joint specialty officers must first receive Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME). They becomes JSOs after completing a joint duty assignment 
Congress specified that a JSO should be: 
an officer, expert in his own warfare specialty and service, who develops a deep 
understanding, broad knowledge, and keen appreciation of the integrated 
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GNA does not allow officers to receive credit for JPME until they reach 0-4 and DoD 
does not permit 0-3s and below from receiving joint duty credit, since junior officers 
supposedly have not become experts in their own services, so they cannot be ready 
to adopt a joint perspective.132 
Waiting until intermediate JPME to introduce officers to joint operational 
concepts inhibits the cultural changes necessary to promote interoperability. It ignores 
the primacy effect and sacrifices the opportunity to establish a joint perspective that 
JPME could build on. 
Officers whose initial training includes joint concepts and whose operational 
experience included even infrequent joint exercises and operations would see JPME 
as a further reinforcement of their experiences. JPME would then be able to begin 
with more advanced instruction on joint concepts. Subsequent tours as a JSO would 
be valued opportunities to improve interoperability. 
Officers without initial exposure to joint concepts will maintain single-service 
perspectives that infrequent exposure to joint operations are unlikely to extinguish. 
As a result, part of JPME will be spent extinguishing single-service perspectives. 
Worse yet, many of these officers will continue to see JPME and joint duty as tickets 
to be punched. These officers may never truly develop a joint perspective and will, 
therefore, be less effective in their joint duty assignments. This would clearly violate 
the intent of GNA and would reduce the effectiveness of the armed forces. 
Panel on Military Education Report. 14. 
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Finally, many officers will never receive JPME or serve in joint duty assignments, 
and many of these will serve on the service staffs that procure equipment and make 
decisions on doctrine and training. If JPME is where officers are supposed to develop 
joint perspectives, then officers who do not receive JPME may never do so. With their 
single-service perspectives, they will continue to downplay the importance of 
interoperability in their planning. As a result, interoperability problems that service 
planners with joint perspectives might have prevented will continue to plague the 
operating forces, as inconveniences during joint exercises, or as tragedies during joint 
combat operations. 
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V. WHITHER INTEROPERABILITY? 
Although none of the reorganizations have altered the systemic problems that 
impede interoperability, the importance of interoperability and the need for more 
frequent interaction appear to have been finally recognized. This chapter analyzes 
recent events and initiatives to determine if they increase routine interaction between 
the services and how they might emphasize the importance of interoperability. The 
thesis concludes with observations concerning the future of efforts to improve 
interoperability. 
A.  ANALYSIS OF RECENT EVENTS 
1.      1993 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Roles, Missions and Functions 
Report 
Required every three years by GNA, this report contains numerous 
proposals that would increase interaction between the services. Just as importantly, 
the report noted that many suggested changes would not produce significant cost 
savings or improvements in military effectiveness and did not recommend them. This 
resistance to change for its own sake is important, as long as it is motivated by 
military effectiveness and not the desire to keep traditional capabilities which are no 
longer required. 
The report proposed assigning Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command 
as the unified commander for U.S. based forces. This is useful, as far as it goes. 
Many U.S. based forces would not be included in this command, including Air Mobility 
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Command and West Coast Navy and Marine Corps units. LANTCOM would develop 
and exercise joint doctrine.133 However, the frequency of joint exercises remains to 
be seen. 
The report also suggests several consolidations and standardizations 
throughout the defense establishment. Among these are depot maintenance, flight 
training, methods of determining aircraft requirements and inventory, test and 
evaluation facilities, and initial skills training.134 All of these would increase interaction 
or create common systems, producing common experiences that enhance 
interoperability. 
2.      Ocean Venture and Tandem Thrust 
Ocean Venture and Tandem Thrust, conducted by Atlantic Command and 
Pacific Command respectively, are annual exercises to improve interoperability. 
Tandem Thrust 92 included an electronic transmission of a Joint Forces Air 
Component Command (JFACC) Air Tasking Order (ATO).135 During Ocean Venture 
92, the naval component commander operated from the joint force commander's (JFC) 
land-based headquarters, making him available to consult with the JFC throughout the 
operation.136  Ocean Venture 93 stationed the JFC at sea, with subsequent transfer 
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to a land-based command center.137 During Tandem Thrust 93, JFACC was 
transferred from USS Blue Ridge to 13th Air Force Headquarters in Guam.138 These 
exercises continue to familiarize personnel with the capabilities of the other services. 
As large scale exercises, however, they are mainly command and control exercises 
that do not necessarily test joint doctrine. 
3.      United States Special Operations Command 
In addition to being a motivating factor for GNA, the tragedy at Desert One 
triggered congressional action concerning the organization of the Special Operations 
Forces (SOF). SOF had been deemphasized by service leaders whose cultural 
assumptions discounted its importance. After Desert One, Congressional SOF 
supporters increased the SOF budget from $440 million in 1981 to $1.1 billion in 1986. 
Although this improved the readiness of SOF, "[joint] command and control remained 
unimproved despite the . . . creation of the Joint Special Operations Agency,"139 
largely because the JSOA was only an advisory body without any authority over 
SOF.140 Procurement of SOF-specific equipment was also a chronic problem. The 
services funded the forces they saw as necessary to face the Soviet threat, which did 
not always include SOF. In addition, funding for SOF was difficult to separate from 
other funds, hampering efforts to improve SOF by increasing its funding. 
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other funds, hampering efforts to improve SOF by increasing its funding. 
By 1986, Congress decided that structural reform was needed to ensure 
that SOF would receive the attention it deserved. Its solution was the creation of the 
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as a unified command. This 
supporting CINC would command all SOF, which would be deployed as component 
commands under each theater CINC.141 Even after the passage of GNA, USSOCOM 
would have been no different than other unified commands if it also consisted of 
service component commands that were funded by their parent services as those 
services saw fit. The separate service cultures, none of which emphasized SOF, 
would continue to neglect SOF, thereby defeating the reason for establishing 
USSOCOM. 
But Congress did not simply superimpose another layer of command 
structure. USSOCOM has two distinctive features that separate it from other unified 
commands. First, it is a functional, as opposed to a geographical, command that 
consists solely of special operations personnel.142 In effect, this has changed the 
culture of the organization that controls SOF, since the service staffs no longer control 
programming decisions for SOF-specific equipment and training. Second, Congress 
created Major Force Program 11 to consolidate SOF-specific programs, and gave 
control of MFP 11 to USCINCSOC.143 This gave USSOCOM the budgetary autonomy 
to fund programs that SOF professionals thought necessary, rather than having 
141
 Rylander, 14. 
142
 James J. Lindsay, Gen. USA, "USSOCOM: Strengthening the SOF Capability," Special Warfare (Spring 
1989), 4. 
143
 Lindsay, 5. 
58 
service staffs, most of whose members have no SOF experience, determine what 
SOF programs would be funded. A "cultural change" occured that eliminated the 
need to reduce "service" autonomy. 
USSOCOM prepared its first budget in 1991 for the FY 1992-97 FYDP. 
Its budget has held nearly steady at about $3 billion for FY 1992 through 1994. 
Among the programs that have finally been funded and have entered production are 
the MC-130H Combat Talon II aircraft and the MH-53J Pavelow helicopter, both of 
which had been stymied by the Air Force since the early 1980s, and the Cyclone- 
class patrol combatants.144 These programs, and many other smaller ones, were 
planned by staffs whose cultural assumptions appreciate the capabilities of SOF and 
whose budget authority permits that vision to be executed. Although interoperability 
is a stated mission of USSOCOM,145 the main lesson for this thesis is that cultural 
change can produce a desired change without the need to reduce statutory autonomy. 
4.      Joint "Center of Excellence" 
In the past two years, Norfolk, Virginia, has become the "undisputed capital 
of doctrinal development." Most of the joint, interservice and service doctrinal 
development centers are located in the Norfolk area, including the Naval Doctrine 
Center, the Air Force Doctrine Center, the Army Training and Doctrine Command, the 
Air Land Sea Application Center, and the Joint Doctrine Center (which will be 
absorbed by the recently announced Joint Warfighting Center, also to be located in 
144
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Norfolk).146 The Naval Doctrine Center is staffed by both Navy and Marine personnel 
and is responsible to both the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.147 The 
Air Land Sea Development Center is tasked with promote interoperability among the 
services.148 The functions of the new Joint Warfighting Center are to: 
- Facilitate the joint doctrine development process and provide a focal point for 
the consideration of emerging warfighting concepts. 
- Provide core expertise to assist in the planning, execution, and assessment of 
joint exercises and training activities.149 
The proximity of these centers promotes routine interaction, enhancing the importance 
of interoperability, and facilitates revision of both service and joint doctrine as lessons 
are learned from joint exercises and operations. 
The development and refinement of joint doctrine will also be enhanced 
by the location of U.S. Atlantic Command headquarters in Norfolk. The Secretary of 
Defense accepted the recommendation of CJCS to place Forces Command, Air 
Combat Command, Atlantic Fleet, and Marine Forces Atlantic under a single combat 
command. Although the services retain their statutory responsibilities for these 
component commands, Atlantic Command will be "responsible for joint training, force 
packaging, and deployment in crises [in order] to ensure that deploying forces are 
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ready on arrival for joint operations."150 As if to emphasize the joint nature of this new 
structure, the previous acronym for Atlantic Command, LANTCOM, has been replaced 
by "USACOM" in October 1993.151 If budgets support the desired level of joint 
exercises, joint doctrine and interoperability can be refined and incorporated by the 
forces of the other unified commands. As these forces operate more frequently with 
the other services, the service cultures will change to accept the importance of 
interoperability. 
5.      Political Factors 
Several political factors could affect the cultural changes needed to 
enhance interoperability. Reduced budgets make it difficult to add training on joint 
concepts to initial training or service-specific courses. Although the administration has 
pledged to maintain training and readiness of operating forces at "prior-year levels,"152 
training courses are being shortened or eliminated.153 Not adding this material 
jeopardizes the cultural changes needed to enhance the importance of interoperability. 
On the positive side, however, are courses that teach common skills. Consolidating 
these courses reduces costs while providing interaction. Many of these courses have 
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already been consolidated,154 and the services have formed the Interservice Training 
Review Organization to determine which training courses are amenable to 
consolidation.155 
Another budgetary constraint is the availability of forces and funds for joint 
exercises, especially interoperability exercises. Although the "operating tempo and 
training rates" of the armed forces are being maintained at previous levels,156 the 
number of forces available for deployment is decreasing. Commitments, however, are 
not being reduced at the same rate. This reduces training time, which hampers 
improvements to joint doctrine and interoperability and reduces interaction between 
the services during their training for deployment, since this training will have to focus 
increasingly on service-specific skills. 
A final political factor is Congressional activism. A main motivating factor 
for each defense reorganization was the perception that the services were more 
interested in preserving their autonomy than in ensuring the most effective fighting 
force. Since the services seemed to be unwilling to cooperate to ensure joint 
effectiveness, organizational changes were imposed to force the services to do so. 
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In recent years, however, this attitude has changed. Countless articles 
have appeared in military journals concerning joint operations. The service leadership 
constantly emphasizes the importance of interoperability. As a result, congressional 
interest has begun to wane, questions about "four air forces" or "two armies" 
notwithstanding. If the services appear to be making good faith efforts to resolve such 
issues, Congress appears to be less inclined to interfere. The emphasis of the Clinton 
administration on domestic issues encourages Congress to pay less attention to 
military operations. Health care and welfare are much more attractive issues for 
substantive debate, while debate on military spending is more in terms of how much 
discretionary spending can be cut. 
B.     CONCLUSIONS 
The services have been independent since the establishment of separate 
departments in 1798. Despite several defense reorganizations, the individual services 
are still responsible for providing and training their own forces. Their decisions about 
what forces to procure and how to train them are based on their differing views of 
what the forces are for. The unified commanders operate the deployed forces, but the 
individual services procure and train them. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
is the principal military advisor to the National Command Authority and issues the 
National Military Strategy, but each of the services separately interpret the strategy 
and devise the means by which they will carry it out. Even though these proposals 
must be approved by OSD, the final product reflects the assumptions of each of the 
services, which are products of their individual philosophies. 
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The independent traditions of the services continue to influence the training of 
military personnel. Since there is no tradition of interoperability, familiarity with other 
services is not emphasized. Since personnel of one service are largely ignorant of 
what the others do, they do not consider the other services in their planning. Since 
operating with other services has not been a traditional mission, it is not emphasized 
in unit training. Accordingly, the services provide forces that are fully capable of 
performing the individual missions for which they have prepared, but less able to 
operate with forces from other services. The forces are not interoperable because 
they were not designed or trained with interoperability in mind. 
The key to improving interoperability is making the services interact at ail levels 
on a routine basis. Joint command structures and high level oversight are fine as far 
as they go. But until the members of the different services operate together on a 
routine basis, joint operations will be seen as exceptional and interoperability will not 
be an important consideration in the services' planning. 
The armed forces are making progress in enhancing interoperability. Desert 
Storm was an effective joint operation despite problems with co-location of component 
commanders and with the air tasking order, and these problems have been addressed 
in subsequent joint exercises. The steps recommended in the 1993 CJCS Roles, 
Missions and Functions Report are useful changes, instead of change for its own 
sake. These changes are certainly slower and less revolutionary than some might 
want. Radical steps could be taken, but would face more opposition than gradually 
increased interaction. Gradually increased interaction will cause a cultural change that 
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will internalize the importance of interoperability. When this has occurred, personnel 
will seek ways to improve coordination of joint operations, instead of simply enduring 
joint exercises until they can return to their "normal" missions. 
Fortunately, there are no credible military threats or political demands that 
require rapid, and therefore less effective, changes to improve interoperability. 
Changing attitudes takes exposure and time. After all, it took 200 years to develop 
non-interoperable forces; Goldwater-Nichols was only passed eight years ago. 
Ironically, a danger to improving interoperability is the declining defense budget. 
While a smaller force structure would seem to require the forces to be able to operate 
together, smaller budgets are threatening training and exercise funding. Training 
budgets are already being reduced; increasing training on joint capabilities will require 
sacrificing something else. Joint exercises are expensive and are funded by the same 
account as operational commitments, which have not been reduced in accordance 
with lower budgets and shrinking force levels. The result might be less initial 
exposure to interoperability, and fewer officers receiving operational reinforcement of 
the importance of interoperability. This would erode the cultural change that is 
required to ensure effective interoperability. Fewer joint exercises would also slow the 
pace of improving joint doctrine and detecting equipment barriers to interoperability. 
The future of U.S. defense strategy is focused on joint operations. These 
operations will require interoperable forces. The six months used to prepare for 
Desert Storm and the lack of opposition to Provide Comfort and Restore Hope cannot 
be relied upon in the future. The forces must be equipped and trained with 
interoperability in mind, so they will be ready to immediately commence joint action. 
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The military and civilian leadership of the defense establishment must exhibit strong 
leadership to make the changes needed to enhance interoperability and to ensure that 
the required programs are adequately funded. 
This thesis provides a new perspective to explain past interoperability problems 
and provides ideas to enhance the importance of interoperability in military planning 
and operations. Hopefully, it can contribute to the formation of a new paradigm 
concerning how the services should interact. Interoperability is a vital contributor to 
the effective defense of national interests. The key to improving interoperability lies 
in increasing interaction rather than imposing command structures; the solution must 
treat the cause, not the symptom. 
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